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Abstract: English and Ecuadorian defamation law have developed very different mechanisms 
to resolve the tension between the right to freedom of speech and the protection of private 
life. Ordinarily this would not be too surprising, insofar as it is natural that different countries 
will have different legal institutions. However, this divergence becomes relevant because 
both jurisdictions claim to be bound by virtually the same human rights obligations when it 
comes to speech related to matters of public interest. For this reason, this article focuses on 
speech issued during electoral campaigns—perhaps the best example of public interest 
speech—in order to assess how different jurisdictions prioritise between the different rights 
and interests at play in these kind of defamation cases. 
 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
Freedom of speech seems to become more important than usual in the midst of an electoral 
campaign. This right allows the public to speak their mind about the issues that are important 
to them and to seek information about different candidates and proposals, as well as enabling 
those candidates to state their views and agenda. Simultaneously, protecting reputation also 
becomes more sensitive during electoral periods since it is perhaps the most valuable asset a 
politician has and it is in these times when it is most likely to come under attack. Moreover, 
there is always the risk that campaigning politicians may make defamatory declarations about 
their rivals, given their objective of convincing voters that they should be elected instead of 
the competition.1 In such cases, it can be hard to determine when remarks are made in the 
interest of an open discussion about political issues, and when they constitute an unlawful 
attempt to damage the image of an opposing candidate and distort the electoral process.2 
Consequently, when political candidates become parties to defamation actions, balancing 
their rights of free speech and private life becomes a complex exercise. 
National jurisdictions are not alone in deciding how to resolve these cases. When it 
comes to defamation actions in general, human rights treaties are particularly relevant as two 
human rights are at tension: freedom of speech and the right to a private life or honour. When 
it comes to political or candidate libels, this relevance increases. After all, a vast part of the 
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jurisprudence of human rights courts in defamation cases deals with cases where the 
complained speech was in the public interest. This is precisely the kind of speech in which 
political candidates engage. 
This article will compare the English law of defamation with that of Ecuador in an 
attempt to understand their different approaches to this issue. The overall objective is to 
assess the effectiveness of human rights treaties in shaping the treatment of political and 
electoral speech by national defamation laws. In order to achieve this, sections B and C will 
attempt to establish what the human rights obligations of the two jurisdictions entail in 
relation to political speech, and what mechanisms each jurisdiction has to ensure compliance 
with their human rights obligations. Section D will look at how considerations concerning 
political speech in general are applied to electoral speech in particular by analysing the 
jurisprudence of the regional human rights courts and of both domestic jurisdictions in cases 
where one or both parties are candidates running for office. Finally, Section E concludes that 
even when human rights obligations regarding freedom of speech are incorporated in 
domestic law, they alone are not capable of determining judicial approaches or outcomes in 
eminently political libel cases. 
 
B.  THE HUMAN RIGHTS TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND HONOUR 
A fundamental characteristic of human rights treaties is that they justify a certain degree of 
intervention into a sovereign state’s internal affairs.3 This is surely the case for the compared 
jurisdictions, since both were among the firsts to sign the human rights treaties of their 
respective regions: the United Kingdom acceded to the European Convention on Human 
Rights (‘ECHR’) in 1950, while Ecuador signed the American Convention on Human Rights 
(‘ACHR’) in 1969.4 Furthermore, both states have included their international human rights 
obligations in their internal legislation, albeit to a different extent. The United Kingdom’s 
Human Rights Act of 1998 (‘HRA’) imposes an obligation on public authorities—including 
courts—to interpret legislation in a way compatible with the ECHR ‘so far as it is possible’, 
and to act in accordance with it.5 Meanwhile, article 424 of the Ecuadorian Constitution of 
																																																						
3 Joseph Raz, ‘Human Rights without Foundations’ in Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas (eds), The 
Philosophy of International Law (OUP 2010) 321, 334. 
4 Council of Europe Treaty Office, ‘Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms’ <www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=005&CM=8&DF=&CL=ENG> 
accessed 4 June 2015; Organization of American States, ‘American Convention on Human Rights "Pact of San 
Jose, Costa Rica" (B-32)’ <www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-
32_American_Convention_on_Human_Rights_sign.htm> accessed 4 June 2015.  
5 Human Rights Act 1998 (adopted 9 November 1998, entered into force 2 October 2000), s 3(1).  
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2008 takes a more dramatic although less specific approach. It states that ‘human rights 
treaties ratified by the state that recognize rights that are more favourable than those 
enshrined in the Constitution shall prevail over any other legal regulatory system or action by 
public authority’.6 Having established this, this section aims to clarify the content of freedom 
of speech and the right to honour or private life in each regional system. This will be done by 
studying the respective conventions and ensuing case law, and pointing out their similarities.  
1. The text of the Conventions  
The text of the human rights conventions is the first source for assessing how they impact 
defamation law. Freedom of expression is enshrined in article 10 of the ECHR and in article 
13 of the ACHR. Both are drafted in an almost identical fashion and include the same 
elements: recognition of freedom of expression as a universal right, a brief development of 
what this right entails—freedom to seek and impart information—and mention of the 
legitimate ends that allow a state to restrict this right when necessary. The same cannot be 
said about how the right to private life is recognised in the two instruments. The ECHR’s 
article 8 protects every person’s right to ‘respect for his private and family life’ and expressly 
forbids public interference with said right (although subsequent jurisprudence has made it 
clear that national courts have an obligation to provide remedies when private individuals or 
organisations unjustifiably breach this right).7 Meanwhile, the text of the ACHR portrays a 
more expansive view. In article 11 it (1) recognises everyone’s right to ‘have his honour 
respected and his dignity recognized’, then (2) forbids ‘arbitrary or abusive’ interferences 
with private life in a way similar to the ECHR’s article 8 (although without addressing public 
authorities exclusively) as well as ‘unlawful attacks’ on honour and reputation, and (3) it 
grants everyone the right to be protected by law against said interferences and attacks.8 
It is hard to tell if this difference in drafting carries actual differences in exercising 
these rights. At a first glance it seems that the ACHR is more concerned with protecting 
honour than its European equivalent, given that it is featured even before private life, and 
states are explicitly committed to protecting it. Yet, the case law of the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights (‘IACtHR’) suggests otherwise. The IACtHR has heard seven cases arising 
																																																						
6 Constitución de la República del Ecuador 2008 (adopted 28 September 2008, entered into force 20 October 
2008) art 424 (‘Constitution 2008’). 
7 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human 
Rights, as amended) (adopted 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953)(ECHR) art 8; Von 
Hannover v Germany ECHR 2004-VI 41. 
8 American Convention on Human Rights 1969 (adopted 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978) 
(ACHR) art 11. 
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out of defamation proceedings at the national stage, and found an Article 13 breach in six.9 
Conversely, it appears that the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) has gradually 
started to place more emphasis on the right to private life in defamation cases. Hence, there is 
a growing number of these decisions where it has either decided that there was no breach of 
freedom of expression for imposing defamation liability or even that the state violated its 
article 8 obligations by failing to declare a person responsible for libel.10 Furthermore, while 
the ECtHR has made it clear that there is a difference between reputation and private life, it 
explicitly recognises that article 8 of the ECHR can cover both even if the former deserves 
protection ‘only sporadically’.11 Thus, in order to understand how each Convention balances 
freedom of speech and the right to a private life, it becomes necessary to examine the case 
law of both the ECtHR and the IACtHR. 
2. How does each human rights court deal with defamation cases?  
Despite the differences mentioned above, both courts have developed a similar protection of 
the rights involved in defamation cases. What is more, the IACtHR often cites the reasoning 
of the ECtHR in its rulings, which may be partially explained by the fact that it was founded 
twenty years later. This has led their respective case law to shape the content of the right to 
freedom of expression in a very similar (if not identical) way in both continents. The 
following appear to be the key similarities between the two courts in this area of law: 
a)  Methodology for assessing permissible restrictions on free speech 
Both courts recognise that the right to freedom of expression as protected by the conventions 
is not absolute. Rather, it may be subject to limitations or subsequent liability when needed to 
secure legitimate ends contemplated in the conventions such as protecting the rights of others, 
public order or health, etc.12 Both the ECtHR and the IACtHR employ an essentially identical 
three-pronged method to assess if restrictions on free speech are within the limits of the 
respective convention or not: first, the limitation must have been previously prescribed by 
law; second, it must have pursued a legitimate end authorised by the Convention; and third, it 
must have been necessary in a democratic society to accomplish said end. This approach 
developed by the ECtHR was imitated by the IACtHR, which in its first case dealing with 
																																																						
9 For an overview of the IACtHR’s jurisprudence on Article 13 until 2009 see: José Antonio Arcila Cano, ‘La 
libertad de expresión en la jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana (1985-2009)’ (2010) 1 Fórum Revista 
Departamento de Ciencia Política 113, 117–124.  
10 Tammer v Estonia ECHR 2001-I 263; Janowski v Poland ECHR 1999-I 187; Chauvy and others v France 
ECHR 2004-VI 205; Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v France ECHR 2007-IV 183; A v Norway App no 
28070/06 (ECtHR 9, April 2009); Petrina v Romania App no 78060/01 (ECtHR, 14 October 2008). 
11 Karakó v Hungary App no 39311/05 (ECtHR, 28 April 2009) [23]. 
12 ECHR, art 10(2); ACHR, art 13(2). 
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defamation cited and applied the methodology employed by the ECtHR in Sunday Times v 
United Kingdom.13 This test seeks to ensure that free speech will only be encumbered when 
necessary to protect an equally important right or objective, which in the case of libel 
proceedings is the reputation or private life of others. In doing so this method introduces the 
idea of proportionality, therefore forcing states to give due consideration to the importance of 
the rights of free speech and reputation in specific cases so that if some restriction is 
necessary, they will adopt the least harmful one.   
When it comes to proportionality, the IACtHR and ECtHR have also come to similar 
findings in relation to the standard of proof that is required from defendants who publish 
statements of fact. First, in the case of Herrera-Ulloa v Costa Rica the IACtHR cited and 
applied the ECtHR’s reasoning in Thoma v Luxembourg according to which journalists 
cannot be required to conform to an excessively stringent standard of proof when reporting 
statements made by a third party.14 Second, both courts have independently found that when 
the complained publication was a factual allegation made in the public interest, which later 
turned out to be wrong, national courts should not impose liability if the circumstances make 
it clear that the defendant who made the allegation had a strong basis for believing the 
statements were true.15 Otherwise, the state would be taking measures that could not be said 
to be necessary in a democratic society. 
b)  Due balance of opposing rights 
Since the ECHR does not recognise an explicit right to honour, the ECtHR did not always 
take the view of treating defamation as a balance of two independent rights.16 Instead, the 
protection of reputation was simply seen as a legitimate objective that in some circumstances 
could authorise restrictions on free speech. On the other hand, the IACtHR still applied this 
approach in spite of the fact that the ACHR does recognise a right of honour.17 However, 
when the ECtHR moved in the direction of recognising that reputation can be a stand-alone 
right included under the article 8 right to a private life, the IACtHR followed suit.18 Thus, in 
Kimel v Argentina the IACtHR began to apply a balancing test between the Article 9 right to 
honour and the Article 13 right to freedom of expression, explaining that it had ‘[taken] note 
																																																						
13 Case of Herrera-Ulloa v Costa Rica, IACtHR Series C No 107 (2 July 2004) [122]–[123], citing Sunday 
Times v United Kingdom App no 6538/74 (ECtHR, 26 April 1979). 
14 ibid [132]–[134], citing Thoma v Luxembourg ECHR 2001-III 67. 
15 Bladet Tromso and Stensaas v Norway ECHR 1999-III 355, [68]–[72]; Case of Tristan Donoso v Panama, 
IACtHR Series C No 193 (27 January 2009), [124]–[126]. 
16 Eric Barendt, Jason Bosland, Rachael Craufurd-Smith and Lesley Hitchens, Media Law Text, Cases and 
Materials (1st edn, Pearson 2014), 366–368. 
17 Case of Herrera-Ulloa (n 13).  
18 Barendt (n 16). 
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of the trends in the case law of other Courts tending to promote, in a rational and balanced 
manner, the protection of those who are entitled to rights apparently contradictory…’ and 
cited the ECtHR cases of  Mamere v France, Castells v Spain, and Cumpana and Mazare v 
Romania.19 Then, the IACtHR followed the pattern that the ECtHR displayed in cases where 
the right to a private life had been engaged: it declared that two independent Convention 
rights were involved and that both required protection, and then it developed a balancing test 
which consists of assessing the circumstances of the case to analyse the degree of impairment 
of the affected right, the relevance of satisfaction of the contradictory right and whether this 
satisfaction justified the damage to the opposing right.20 In its previous case of Herrera-Ulloa 
v Costa Rica, the Court clearly treated the article 11 right to honour as a possible exception to 
free speech but did not emphasise its rank of conventional right (although a concurring 
opinion by Judge Sergio Garcia did point out this inconsistency).21 
c)  Special protection of public interest speech 
Public figures and officials in the Americas must tolerate a wide range of criticism just as 
their peers do in Europe. The underlying notion being that for democracy to work it is 
necessary that all people be free to discuss matters of public interest and to seek information 
regarding them. The interest in openly discussing matters such as the functioning of public 
institutions, the way authorities and officials perform their duties, or their suitability for 
office is so strong that possible trumps to freedom of expression must give way in almost all 
but the most exceptional cases. It is not that authorities or public figures involved in these 
affairs have a lesser right to a reputation or private life than ordinary citizens. It is rather that 
the opposing right of freedom of expression gains so much importance in these kinds of cases 
that when both rights are balanced, the latter one tends to be favoured. The impairment to the 
right to protect one’s reputation in these circumstances is considered to be a lesser evil than 
the damage to freedom of expression that would ensue if people were not free to discuss these 
matters. Otherwise, the chilling effect on journalists and media could result in the public 
having less access to information and opinions on issues of public interest.  
Two cases were pivotal in laying out this principle: Lingens v Austria and Herrera-
Ulloa v Costa Rica. Both involved journalists convicted of criminal libel for allegations they 
																																																						
19 Case of Kimel v Argentina, Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 177 (2 May 2008) [78], citing 
Mamere v France ECHR 2006-XIII 99; Castells v Spain App no 11798/85 (ECtHR, 23 April 1992); Cumpana 
and Mazare v Romania ECHR 2004-XI 63. 
20 ibid [79], [84]. 
21 Case of Herrera-Ulloa (n 13); Case of Herrera-Ulloa (n 13) (Judge Garcia). 
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published about public authorities.22 This is another instance in which the IACtHR drew 
inspiration from the decisions of the ECtHR.23 In deciding whether Costa Rica breached its 
human rights obligations, the IACtHR referred to the ‘jurisprudence constante’ of the ECtHR 
and specifically to Lingens v Austria: 
The limits of acceptable criticism are accordingly wider as regards a politician as 
such than as regards a private individual. Unlike the latter, the former inevitably and 
knowingly lays himself open to close scrutiny of his every word and deed by both 
journalists and the public at large, and he must consequently display a greater degree 
of tolerance.24 
After examining regional human rights jurisprudence involving defamation 
proceedings, it can be concluded that the content and limits of the right to freedom of 
expression are almost identical in Europe and the Americas. This does not appear to be a 
mere coincidence but rather a consequence of the IACtHR’s search for guidance in the 
ECtHR’s past decisions. This implies that jurisdictions that have ratified the ACHR or ECHR 
should follow the same broad standards when they approach defamation actions involving 
political speech. Essentially, they must ensure that restrictions on freedom of speech are not 
imposed in a way that is disproportionate or unnecessary in a democratic society, considering 
the importance of public interest speech. This is especially true in the case of the United 
Kingdom and Ecuador, since both have incorporated human rights treaty compliance into 
their national law. 
C.  DEFENCES TO POLITICAL LIBELS UNDER NATIONAL LAW 
The same rights at the supranational level inform both English and Ecuadorian defamation 
laws. Nevertheless, both jurisdictions have developed very different mechanisms to resolve 
these cases. Ordinarily this would not be too surprising, insofar as it is natural that different 
states will have different laws. However, this divergence becomes interesting because by 
virtue of ratifying the respective human rights conventions, both states are bound by virtually 
the same human rights obligations when it comes to political libels. For this reason, this 
section will analyse the main defences in national defamation laws applicable to political or 
electoral speech and reflect on their compatibility with conventional standards.  
																																																						
22 Lingens v Austria (1986) Series A no 103; Case of Herrera-Ulloa (n 13). 
23 Besides citing Lingens, the IACtHR also referenced the following decisions: Dichand and others v Austria 
App no 29271/95 (ECtHR, 26 February 2002); Castells v Spain App no 11798/85 (ECtHR, 23 April 1992); 
Sürek v Turkey ECHR 1999-IV 353. 
24 Lingens v Austria (n 22) [42], cited in Case of Herrera-Ulloa (n 13) [125]. 
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First, it is necessary to note the most significant difference between the compared 
jurisdictions: while libel has been a predominantly civil action in England, in Ecuador it is 
mostly tried as a privately enforced criminal offence.25 Hence, unless stated otherwise, all 
references to libel in Ecuador within this article refer to its criminal variant.  
In fact, libel has been listed as a criminal offence in Ecuador since its first Criminal 
Code, whereas the possibility of recovering damages from defamatory statements via a civil 
suit only appeared in 1984.26 It is possible to presume that the Ecuadorian legislature’s 
decision to create a civil action for those who are defamed had to do with political shifts at 
the time. Just five years earlier, in 1979, two major events took place: in domestic affairs, the 
country returned to democracy after a twenty-year period of military juntas, overthrown 
governments, and interim presidents; in the international front, the IACtHR started 
functioning.27 Perhaps influenced by this move towards a liberal political system, the 
legislators at the time sought to create a mechanism for protecting reputation that was less 
restrictive towards freedom of expression. If this is the case, their omission to simultaneously 
abolish or reform criminal libel seriously hampered their efforts.  
As for criminal libel under Ecuadorian law, its definition was recently narrowed 
down. Until 2014 the offence of libel (‘injuria’) included two categories: ‘calumniosa’ and 
‘no calumniosa’. The first consisted of the ‘false imputation of a crime’, while the latter 
comprised ‘every expression proffered to discredit, disdain or dishonour another person’.28 
When legislators replaced the Criminal Code with an entirely new one in 2014, they chose to 
list the first variant of libel as a serious offence (‘delito’), and reduced the second variant to a 
summary offence with a maximum sentence of 30 days in prison. Thus, since its entry into 
force only defamatory remarks to the effect that a person committed a crime can be impugned 
through full criminal proceedings. This criminal offence is punishable with a prison sentence 
of six months to two years and a compensatory damages award.29 While this reform can be 
said to be a small advance towards a less restrictive law on defamation, the lack of 
simultaneous reforms aimed at providing a wider range of defences for criminal and civil 
libel means that political speech is still unprotected in multiple situations, as will be 
demonstrated in section 3 below.  
																																																						
25 Código Orgánico Integral Penal, art 182 (‘COIP’).  
26 Código Penal 1837, arts 497–513; Ley Reformatoria de Código Civil sobre Reparación de Danos Morales, 
art 1.  
27 ‘Basic Documents in the Inter-American System’ (Organization of American States, 2011) 
<www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/Basics/intro.asp> accessed 3 August 2015.  
28 Código Penal 1971, arts 489–502 (Criminal Code 1971). 
29 COIP (n 25). 
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1. Duty-based defences  
When it comes to defamatory statements of fact, both jurisdictions take into account the 
public’s stake in hearing the complained statements, although to a very different extent. In 
English law, qualified privilege has developed to be one of the most important defences for 
protecting political speech from defamation liability. While it was originally meant to protect 
defendants who were duty-bound to share information about the plaintiff with third parties 
through private communications (for instance, letters of reference), it slowly evolved to cover 
a wider range of circumstances.30 Eventually, in Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd the House 
of Lords decided that under the right conditions a defendant could rely on this type of defence 
for defamatory factual allegations published to larger audiences.31 Thus, it recognised that 
there are certain kinds of speech that society in general has a protectable interest in receiving, 
a notion very similar to that espoused by the IACtHR in Canese v Paraguay analysed below 
in section 3.32 Indeed, when Lord Nicholls delivered his opinion stating that the common law 
allowed qualified privilege to protect widely published allegations as long as the defendant 
met the standards of responsible journalism and acted without malice, he explicitly 
considered the public’s entitlement to receive said information:  
The court should be slow to conclude that a publication was not in the public interest 
and, therefore, the public had no right to know, especially when the information is in 
the field of political discussion. Any lingering doubts should be resolved in favour of 
publication.33 
As in other forms of qualified privilege, the essence of these cases relies more on 
audiences’ right to access the subject-matter of the defamation action than in the defendants’ 
right to speak their mind. The statutory successor of this common law defence, ‘publication 
on matter of public interest’, is similar enough to maintain the same principle.34  
In Ecuador, a defendant’s duty to publish a statement used to be a trump for 
defamation liability, although the recent criminal reform leaves this part of the law unclear. 
Historically, defamation in Ecuador included an objective and a subjective element to the 
cause of action.35 The former referred to the fact that the statements must have been 
																																																						
30 Andrew T Kenyon, ‘Protecting Speech in Defamation Law: Beyond Reynolds-Style Defences’ (2014) 6 JML 
21. 
31 Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd and Others [1999] UKHL 45, [2001] 2 AC 127. 
32 Case of Ricardo Canese v Paraguay, Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 111 (31 August 
2004). 
33 Reynolds (n 31) 205 (emphasis added). 
34 Defamation Act 2013 (adopted 25 April 2013, entered into force 1 January 2014) s4. 
35 Concepción Carmona Salgado, Calumnias, Injurias y Otros Atentados al Honor (1st edn, Tirant Lo Blanch 
2012), 67–78. 
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defamatory, while the latter required that the defendant be motivated by the will to harm the 
victim’s reputation. This subjective element is called animus injurandi.36 As a consequence, 
if a defendant was not moved by the desire to injure the claimant, the action will not gather 
all the required elements and it will fail. At first glance this subjective element would appear 
to benefit the defendant, since the burden of proof should fall on the claimant in criminal 
actions, and specific intent of this sort is often hard to prove. However, in Ecuador as well as 
in Spain and other jurisdictions that feature animus injurandi, judges tend to presume this 
intent relying solely on the meaning of the words or on its context.37 This has urged 
defendants to attempt to prove their lack of animus injurandi by demonstrating that other 
considerations motivated their statement. When it comes to statements of fact of a political 
nature, defendants usually claim that they were moved by animus denunciandi, ie the will to 
denounce. The Ecuadorian National Court (Ecuador’s Supreme Court) has held multiple 
times that when defendants make the complained statement in order to denounce wrongdoing 
there is no animus injurandi.38 The reasoning for this finding is that the animus injurandi 
becomes excluded when ‘a person denounces irregularities, acts of corruption or simple 
wrongdoings of third parties, [since] she is acting within the frame of the duties and 
responsibilities that the Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador imposes on all citizens’.39 
Even though the National Court recognises a duty to denounce wrongdoing, it does not 
address the corresponding interest or right of the public to access said information. However, 
after the 2014 Criminal Code reform, the new statutory provision for libel does not include 
any reference to animus injurandi. This should prevent judges from continuing to require this 
subjective element for a libel action to succeed, although it would not be surprising if they 
persisted in assessing the defendant’s motivations.40 After all, the article dealing with libel in 
the previous version of the Criminal Code also did not include it.41 A similar situation 
																																																						
36 ibid. 
37 ibid. For instance, in Expediente No 360-2001 RO 464 29 November 2001, [6], the Ecuadorian Supreme 
Court, without examining the content of the expressions or how they may impact audiences, found that ‘because 
of their nature the words used constitute defamatory expressions destined to cause harm to their recipient; even 
more because of the newspaper page on which they were published, their size (half a page) and the 
characteristics of their publication, they incontrovertibly denote their author’s animus injurandi’. 
38 However, only in one of these decisions were the allegations published to the world at large; see Gaceta 
Judicial 9 Serie XVIII (23 September 2010) 3238; Expediente No 865-2009 RO Supl 38 7 August 2013; 
Expediente No 632-2009 RO Supl 186 1 September 2011.  
39 Gaceta Judicial 9 Serie XVIII (23 September 2010) 3238, [6]. 
40 COIP (n 25). 
41 Criminal Code 1971 (n 28). 
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occurred in Spain, where a reform in 1995 eliminated all mention of animus injurandi from 
the statutes but a majority of regional courts persisted in requiring its presence.42 
That both English and Ecuadorian systems have a tradition of allowing defendants to 
avoid liability when they had a duty to make the allegations is noteworthy. However, the way 
they assess whether said duty existed and if it effectively protects the impugned publication 
appears to reveal their attitudes towards solving conflicts between reputation and freedom of 
expression. The English common law, in a deliberate attempt to harmonise its approach to 
freedom of expression with that of the ECtHR, finds the existence of public interest—and 
hence qualified privilege—even if the remarks are defamatory, as long as the information was 
published responsibly. Proving that the publication complied with the standards of 
responsible journalism then becomes an exercise in assessing whether the information was 
treated in a manner professional enough to warrant that the public will be well-served by 
reading it.43 The emphasis demonstrated by English courts in making sure that adjudicators 
do not apply these standards too taxingly reveals an interest in not restricting the public 
conversation about important issues.44 Meanwhile, Ecuadorian law presupposes animus 
injurandi when the remarks are defamatory. When defendants disprove this presumption, the 
Court only finds in their favour because citizens have a civic duty to impede corruption.45 
Little to no consideration is given to audiences’ right to participate in public debates, despite 
the IACtHR’s vehement stressing of the importance of the social dimension of freedom of 
expression.46  
2. Fair comment defences 
The possibility of expressing opinions on issues of public interest even when they may be 
defamatory is patently important for political speech. The ECtHR stressed this in Lingens v 
Austria when it explained that opinions and value judgments must be afforded wider 
protection than statements of fact since they are not verifiable.47 It has also been emphasised 
by the IACtHR in Kimel v Argentina, where it found that Argentina had failed to meet its 
human rights obligations when it found a historian liable for a book in which he criticised the 
officials responsible for the investigation of a politically motivated massacre.48  
																																																						
42 Concepción Carmona Salgado (n 35). 
43 Barendt (n 16). 
44 Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe Sprl [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 AC 359. 
45 See n 38. 
46 Canese (n 32) [94]. 
47 Lingens (n 22) [45]–[46]. 
48 Kimel (n 19) [93]. 
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Under English law, demonstrating that the statement subject to the defamation action 
is an opinion made concerning a matter of public interest is a defence to defamation. The 
common law defence of fair comment and its statutory successor of honest opinion recognise 
the individual’s right to expose her views on affairs of public interest, as well as society’s 
interest in the free discussion of ideas.49 Just as with the Reynolds defence, the jurisprudential 
evolution of fair comment has been marked by attempts to safeguard the public’s interest. 
This explains the lenient standard for what constitutes public interest when the impugned 
publication is one of opinion, which clearly seems to incentivise comment on public affairs.50 
More recently, the relaxation of the degree to which defendants must indicate the basis of 
their opinions in order to have a successful defence reveals an attempt to broaden the 
protection afforded to public interest speech. This development appears to reveal a move 
towards a less paternalistic attitude towards public debate, since the common law—and since 
2013 the Defamation Act—is now satisfied that audiences can be well-served with just a 
general indication of what the comment is about, as opposed to requiring defendants to 
specifically identify the basis of their opinion.51 It is notable how, when it comes to opinions, 
English courts have been preoccupied with the tension between reputation and freedom of 
speech at least decades before the HRA required them to do so.52  
As for Ecuador, published opinions used to be defensible in the same way as 
statements of fact: by proving the lack of animus injurandi (specific intent). Just as a factual 
allegation could be defended if its author was motivated by animus denunciandi (the need to 
denounce), value judgments or opinions may be defended by demonstrating a series of 
motivations or animi. According to the National Court, when there is ‘animus corigendi –to 
correct–, animus jocandi –to joke–, animus criticandi –to criticise–, animus defendi or 
retorquendi –to reply in defence or to contradict– there is no criminal offence’.53 Nonetheless, 
just as with defamatory statements of fact, this defence is inadequate to protect public interest 
speech because it forces defendants to prove their motivation, which in some cases may be 
impossible. Moreover, this fixation on motives or animi ignores that people sometimes speak 
or publish comments motivated by more than one reason. For instance, a candidate may cast 
doubt about her opponent’s suitability for office because she genuinely doubts it herself while 
simultaneously believing that this will hurt his image with voters.   
																																																						
49 Defamation Act 2013, s 3. 
50 London Artists Ltd v Littler [1968] EWCA Civ 3, [1969] 2 QB 375, 391. 
51 British Chiropractic Association v Singh [2010] EWCA Civ 350, [2011] 1 WLR 133. 
52 Silkin v Beaverbrook Newspapers Ltd [1958] 1 WLR 743 (QB), 746–747. 
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The difficulties with using motivation as a quasi-defence were palpable in Ecuador’s 
most famous libel case of the last decade, Correa v Palacio.54 In 2011, an Ecuadorian appeal 
court confirmed the conviction of journalist Emilio Palacio for libelling the President of the 
Republic, Rafael Correa. Mr Palacio published a column in which he doubted the 
Government’s version of the events of a police riot that took place in September 2010 and 
warned Mr Correa that ‘a new president, perhaps an enemy of yours, could bring you to 
criminal court for ordering unannounced discretionary fire against a hospital full of civilians 
…’.55 Mr Correa initiated a private indictment for criminal libel against the author, the 
corporation that owned the newspaper, and its three directors. The outcome was a three year 
prison conviction for Mr Palacio (although this was reduced in the appeal decision to six 
months) and an award of damages initially set at USD 40 million but later reduced to USD 
600,000.56  The appellate court found that Mr Palacio was motivated by the will to injure Mr 
Correa’s reputation, a conclusion it grounded on the fact that he had used especially strong 
language that sought to ‘create a special disaffection towards Rafael Vicente Correa Delgado 
in the mind of the reader’, in reference to the repeated use of the term ‘dictator’.57 It also 
accepted the claimant’s submission that the article contained an imputation of a crime, 
despite the indication that it was discussing a hypothetical situation. The fact that Mr 
Palacio’s column was a comment on public events that affected the whole nation and that 
were being hotly debated at the time was not deemed relevant. Furthermore, the Court 
abstained from applying the proportionality test prescribed by the IACtHR despite being 
urged to do so by the defendant, and did not consider in its reasoning that the claimant was 
the President. This decision was impugned by the defendants but Mr Correa chose to pardon 
them before the National Court could lay down its judgment, amidst strong international 
pressure.58  
The extent to which the two jurisdictions allow honest opinions to function as a shield 
against defamation liability is just as revealing as the previous group of defences, if not more 
so. The English common law has not evaded the task of assessing when the public interest is 
at stake and to what degree must defendants indicate the basis of their opinions; on the 
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contrary, it has developed these notions in a direction compatible with allowing more speech 
rather than less.59 Therefore, before the UK was legally obligated to do so, it still acted in a 
manner compatible with its human rights obligations. On the other hand, at a domestic level 
Ecuadorian law lacks a full-fledged defence for defamatory opinions on matters of public 
interest.60 Proving that the subjective element of the offence is missing is a quasi-defence at 
most, and neither the legislator nor the courts have developed it in a meaningful way, as 
Correa v Palacio attests.  
The effort in providing defences to protect political speech—both in the form of 
stating facts and of expressing opinions—can be a good indication of how much each state’s 
adjudicators and lawmakers value it. Whether these defences are specific to this category of 
speech or can apply to broader public interest matters is immaterial, what matters is that they 
exist. If they do not, it could sensibly be interpreted either as an overzealous protection of 
reputation or as a lack of concern for the role of freedom of expression in shaping up 
society’s ideas and attitudes. In the case of Ecuador this can be seen as a lack of interest in 
complying with the state’s obligations under the American Convention, and its consequences 
appear to be dire.61 From the analysed cases, it appears that when the subject-matter pertains 
to especially contested issues of public interest, the lack of defences enables the enforcement 
of mainstream narratives since it discourages alternative explanations or views that may be 
defamatory to the involved parties.62 
 
D.  DEFAMATION CASES INVOLVING CANDIDATES FOR PUBLIC OFFICE 
A political candidate insulting or smearing a rival is not exactly rare during election season. 
Some have called it ‘the stuff of which political debate is made’,63 while others recognise it 
as an inherent risk in politics pointing out that ‘[t]hose who play at bowls must expect 
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rubbers’.64 But despite how common these exchanges may be or how settled the limits of free 
speech on issues of public interest are, instances of politicians defaming each other still reach 
the courts. When this happens, judges need to evaluate if the impugned speech falls under the 
wide protection afforded to the discussion of issues of public interest that has been 
established, or if the limit has been exceeded, unlawfully harming the claimant-politician as a 
result. Thus, the main issue in these cases is defining the limits of public interest speech in 
the midst of electoral campaigns, scenarios characteristically adversarial and extremely 
public. How far is too far when it comes to revealing information and expressing opinions 
about those who aspire to public office? Each jurisdiction’s answer to this question will vary 
depending on its political climate and attitude towards public debate, as this section will 
argue.  
1. Political candidate libels in supranational jurisdictions 
Unsurprisingly, on occasion the tension between candidates’ need to protect their reputation 
and their adversaries’ desire to undermine it have exceeded national jurisdictions and ended 
up before regional human rights courts. Following the jurisprudential developments 
summarised in section 1, both courts have arrived at similar findings in the following cases: 
a)  Canese v Paraguay (2004)65 
This case arose from events taking place during the first free presidential elections in 
Paraguay after thirty-five years of military government under Alfredo Stroessner. In 1992, 
presidential candidate Mr Ricardo Canese stated that his rival Mr Wasmosy—who would 
later win the election—had ‘passed from bankruptcy to the most spectacular wealth, thanks to 
support from the dictator’s family’ and that ‘Mr Wasmosy was the Stroessner family’s front 
man in CONEMPA, and the company transferred substantial dividends to the dictator’.66 This 
was accompanied by further statements criticising how the Government had assigned all 
constructing and engineering contracts in the Itaipú hydroelectric station to CONEMPA, a 
private company presided by Mr Wasmosy. The statements drew considerable attention 
because Mr Canese was considered an expert in energy matters, having conducted research 
and published books in this area since the 1970s.67 After the election, two of CONEMPA’s 
directors initiated criminal libel proceedings against Mr Canese. The ensuing trial and appeal 
process lasted until 2002, with Mr Canese being convicted in 1997. Although he was never 
imprisoned, he was unable to leave the country until the matter was finally resolved, except 
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for a few instances in 1999. Interestingly, the Paraguayan Supreme Court absolved Mr 
Canese just before the IACtHR reached its decision, but this did not stop the latter from 
finding that Paraguay had breached its freedom of expression obligations. 
The rationale behind the IACtHR’s decision could be subdivided in two broad 
categories: one dealing with public interest matters as protected speech and one concerned 
with the public’s interest in what a candidate says. In the first group of considerations, the 
IACtHR conducted its usual proportionality test and restated that speech on matters of public 
interest must be afforded more latitude than other types of expression.68 It pointed out that 
while politicians and public officials also have the right to have their honour respected, they 
must tolerate a wider margin of criticism. Hence, the IACtHR considered that the Paraguayan 
national courts ignored Convention standards when they failed to recognise the context in 
which the allegations had been made: 
[J]udicial bodies should have taken into account that he made his statements in the 
context of an electoral campaign for the presidency of the Republic and with regard to 
matters of public interest; circumstances in which opinions and criticisms are issued 
in a more open, intense and dynamic way … .69  
This could have been enough for the IACtHR to justify finding a breach of the 
ACHR. However, the Court espoused a second group of considerations that emphasised how 
the public benefited from being able to access Mr Canese’s views and information. The Court 
referred to the public’s interest in hearing the speech as the social dimension of freedom of 
expression, and stressed that it helps voters to form an opinion, and that it ‘strengthen[s] the 
political contest between the different candidates ...’.70 The Court explained that when 
making the speech subject to the allegations, Mr Canese had not only exercised his right to 
disseminate his views, but had also promoted the engagement of the electorate in the 
campaign by providing it with ‘additional elements for forming an opinion and taking 
decisions regarding the election of the future President of the Republic’.71 The Court even 
considered that the newspapers that published the allegations played an essential role by 
allowing the public to know ‘the opinion of one of the presidential candidates about another, 
which ensured that the electoral had more information and different opinions before it took a 
decision’.72  
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In essence, the IACtHR seemed to suggest that in matters of public interest the scope for 
imposing liability diminishes as the public’s interest in accessing the impugned statements 
grows. It is likely that Mr Canese’s statements would have been protected speech even if he 
had not been a presidential candidate when he made them. However, since they were said in 
the context of the first free Paraguayan elections, the IACtHR felt compelled to take the 
electorate’s interest into account which resulted in an additional factor being taken into 
consideration in order to decide whether Paraguay breached its human rights obligations.73 
This emphasis on the public’s right to seek information bears resemblance to the common 
law doctrine of duty-interest in qualified privilege defences. 
b)  Karakó v Hungary (2009)74 
While Canese v Paraguay dwelled on candidates’ rights to freedom of expression, Karakó v 
Hungary reflected upon why they should not be too reliant on courts to protect their 
reputation. Mr Karakó, member of the Hungarian National Assembly in representation of the 
Fidesz political party, submitted an application to the ECtHR complaining that Hungary had 
failed to protect his right to a private life when the national courts dismissed his attempt to 
prosecute a political opponent for criminal libel. The alleged defamation consisted of leaflets 
that were distributed during the 2002 elections which stated that candidate Karakó ‘regularly 
voted against the interests of the county’, signed by the chairman of the regional General 
Assembly.75 The ECtHR found that no breach had taken place.  
It is telling that the Court found that article 8 had not been engaged, but did not stop 
its decision at this point. It deemed appropriate to expressly point out that if the Hungarian 
courts had imposed liability on the applicant’s critic they would have been acting 
disproportionately to his freedom of expression rights, taking into account that the applicant 
‘was a politician, active in public life, and that the statement was made during an election 
campaign in which he was a candidate, and constituted a negative opinion regarding the 
applicant’s public activities’.76  
Both cases seem to suggest that politicians have to endure a much larger share of 
criticism and even defamatory remarks than the public at large. To be more precise, the 
public interest in discussing politicians’ suitability for office, their platforms, and views is so 
crucial, that very rarely will the ECtHR or IACtHR find that their right to a private life has 
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been breached by what is said about them in campaign season.77 These decisions also 
reiterate that in libel cases regarding matters of public interest, states party to the ACHR or 
the ECHR ought to follow the same standards for balancing the competing rights. More 
interestingly, they confirm that these common standards extend to electoral speech.  
2. Political candidate libels in English case law 
As mentioned above, English law presents two main defences for political libels: fair 
comment, now replaced by the statutory defence of honest opinion, and Reynolds qualified 
privilege, replaced by section 4 of the Defamation Act 2013, for allegations of fact. The fair 
comment defence has traditionally offered broad protection for political candidates as long as 
the speech remains clearly within the boundaries of opinion and does not cross into the realm 
of factual allegations. This seems to be a ‘recognition of the high (but not absolute) 
importance that the common law attached even as long ago as 1850 to protecting the 
expression of opinion on certain matters’.78 However, electoral addresses and other forms of 
electoral speech often include allegations of fact, whether intentional or not. Thus, a pivotal 
question in cases between canvassing politicians has been whether an electoral campaign can 
give rise to a privileged occasion, and if so to what extent. Although it is now clear that 
politicians’ election addresses and speeches are susceptible to the present day incarnation of 
qualified privilege for public interest speech (codified in section 4 of the Defamation Act 
2013), this was not always the case.79 The treatment of this issue has varied considerably over 
the past sixty years, demonstrating the shift from a common law position that protected this 
form of speech given certain conditions, to one based on the ECtHR and the HRA that 
considers political speech as protected by default (while admitting that in some circumstances 
it may be subject to sanctions or damages). This evolution can be followed by referring to 
three main cases: 
a)  Braddock v Bevins (1948)80 
Mrs Elizabeth Braddock, a Member of Parliament who canvassed in favour of a fellow 
Labour candidate in a 1946 municipal election, sued Mr John Reginald Bevins, the 
Conservative candidate that won the election. Mrs Braddock complained of statements made 
by the defendant to the effect that she was in alliance with communists. The appellant argued 
that the complained speech was not protected by privilege because it had been disseminated 
too broadly, so that even if the candidate-defendant had a duty to inform, the recipients were 
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too many to have a corresponding interest.81 She also argued that even if the occasion was 
privileged this was not a valid defence since the defendant’s motivation was to defeat his 
rival, which indicates malice. Neither of these assertions convinced the Court. Lord Greene 
MR recognised that voters have a strong interest in learning about what one candidate has to 
say about another: 
We should have thought it scarcely open to doubt that statements contained in the 
election address of one candidate concerning the opposing candidate, provided they 
are relevant to the matters which the electors will have to consider in deciding which 
way they will cast their votes, are entitled to the protection of qualified privilege. The 
electors clearly have an interest in receiving a communication of that kind. Indeed, 
the task of the electors under democratic institutions could not be satisfactorily 
performed if such a source of relevant information bona fide given were to be cut off 
by the fear of an action for libel.82 
Moreover, the Court found ‘untenable’ the view that because a candidate intends to win the 
election he is necessarily acting with malice when making statements about his rival.83  
b)  Plummer v Charman (1962)84 
The decision in Braddock was in line with the common law approach to privilege in political 
libels as well as with how freedom of speech is understood in consolidated democracies.85 
However, its potential consequence of restricting politicians’ ability to protect their 
reputations in the courts lead Parliament to essentially reverse Braddock by including a 
provision in the 1952 Defamation Act to impede candidates from using the defence of 
qualified privilege.86 This reversal lead to the Court of Appeal ruling in Plummer v Charman 
that there is ‘no privilege known to the law which entitles persons engaged in politics to 
misstate facts about their opponents provided they say it honestly even though untruthfully’.87  
c)  Culnane v Morris (2005)88 
After the HRA was introduced and judges were compelled to take the ECHR into 
consideration, the matter of qualified privilege was bound to be brought before the courts 
again.89 In this case a candidate standing for the British National Party in a local election 
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complained that leaflets distributed by the defendant, the Liberal Democrat candidate, were 
defamatory since they suggested a past of criminal convictions. It was held that the 
candidate-defendant was not precluded from relying on a defence of qualified privilege. In 
his judgment, Eady J found that the decision in Plummer v Charman was not compatible with 
the HRA since it left candidates in ‘a worse position [than] anyone else’ during election 
campaigns.90 He considered that in compliance with the HRA a candidate-defendant may 
plea a defence of qualified privilege just as anyone else, and that section 10 of the 
Defamation Act 1952 only meant that a candidate does not enjoy an occasion of privilege 
simply because he is standing for office and addressing issues material to that election.91 In 
order to reach this conclusion, Eady J referred to the ‘usual ingredients’ of duty and interest 
that the common law requires for an occasion to be privileged, and reasoned that it was 
certainly possible that such a situation could arise for electoral speech.92 To support this 
position Eady J cited three ECtHR cases that support the following view, similar to that held 
by the IACtHR in Canese: the public’s interest in accessing information and opinions about 
political candidates during election periods is so crucial that restrictions on electoral speech 
need to be more carefully considered than when dealing with broader political speech.93 This 
position is well represented in the following extract of Bowman v United Kingdom cited by 
Eady J: 
[A]s the court has observed in the past, freedom of expression is one of the 
‘conditions’ necessary to ‘ensure the free expression of opinion of the people in the 
choice of legislature’. For this reason, it is particularly important in the period 
preceding an election that opinions and information of all kinds are permitted to 
circulate freely.94 
In sum, English law provides wide protection to electoral speech, although this 
protection is less comprehensive for factual allegations than for opinions. Yet even when it 
comes to defamatory allegations of fact, present day English courts recognise that candidate-
defendants must have defences at their disposal.95 Otherwise, relevant information would be 
needlessly ‘cut off’ from electors.96 In this regard, it seems that the ‘usual ingredients’ of the 
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common law defence of qualified privilege have always had the potential of protecting 
speech issued by political candidates. However, judges have been slow in gradually 
extending privilege from communications between individuals to speech between a candidate 
and a large audience. In an important way, this judicial evolution has been dictated by 
changes in political climate. As Ian Loveland points out, Braddock was preceded by 
successive electoral reforms aimed at widening democratic participation.97 In the same sense, 
Culnane v Morris was influenced by the House of Lords’ pivotal decision in Reynolds, which 
in turn followed the precepts of the HRA. Therefore, while English law and courts are 
generally open to protecting political speech, their decisions are also heavily influenced by 
how judges interpret political moments. This interpretation can be swayed—when not 
outright reversed—by statutory means, as the Defamation Act and the case of Plummer v 
Charman indicate.  
    3. Political candidate libels in Ecuadorian case law 
As mentioned above, Ecuadorian law offers two distinct causes of action for those who 
believe they have been defamed: a civil action called daño moral (moral damage) and a 
privately enforced criminal offence that since 2014 is called calumnia. The key distinction 
between them—besides a prison sentence—is that only statements of fact give rise to 
criminal libel.98 In the civil variant of defamation, opinions have the potential of causing 
liability but are less likely to do so than factual statements. The reason for this is that the 
statutory provision for daño moral requires the defendant to have damaged the claimant’s 
reputation through illicit actions or omissions.99 While ‘illicitness’ is not defined in the 
statute, the Ecuadorian Constitution makes it clear that people have the right to ‘voice one’s 
opinion’.100 Consequently, most judges will not rule that a person acted illicitly for 
disseminating speech that is solely comprised of opinions.101 Therefore, just as under English 
law, most libel cases involving electoral speech revolve around statements of fact.102 Both 
civil and criminal actions display a similar judicial treatment of libels involving political 
candidates, as the following cases suggest. 
a)  Civil libel cases 
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i) Ruiz v Villacis (2007)103 
The defendant, Luis Villacis, was a congressman at the time of the proceedings and a 
candidate when he issued the complained publication in which he criticised several people’s 
involvement in Ecuador’s financial crisis of 1999. Within this context, he stated that the 
claimant (who was not a politician) had accusations of money laundering filed against him 
and that he was imprisoned for embezzling religious communities.104 Mr Villacis was held 
liable at every instance, which seems sensible because the accusations are certainly serious 
and capable of being defamatory, yet he did not attempt to justify them as true. Nevertheless, 
it is remarkable how the National Court did not consider at all whether imposing liability 
could breach the defendant’s right to free speech under the ACHR. Furthermore, the Court 
also omitted any mention of the electorate’s interest or right to hear information about issues 
of public interest, despite the fact that the speech dealt with the most dramatic economic 
crisis in the country’s recent history and in spite of how the IACtHR has emphasised the 
social dimension of free speech. Even if the decision were to be the same, it seems odd that 
the Court did not at least entertain the notion that Mr Villacis’s statements may have been 
‘licit’ because they aimed at informing voters about relevant public issues. On the contrary, 
the Court found it adequate to state that the right to have one’s reputation protected ‘must be 
observed without exception’ and that ‘no one, absolutely no one, … is authorised to attack 
this right’.105 
ii) Velez v Benavides (2010)106 
In this case, the claimant was a congresswoman at the time of the proceedings and a 
candidate when the allegedly defamatory speech was published. She brought a claim against 
a former colleague who distributed leaflets during the election accusing her of nepotism in a 
non-governmental organisation with which they were both involved. Once again, the 
National Court gave no consideration to the defendant’s freedom of speech or to the 
electorate’s interest in hearing about the accusations, despite the fact that they addressed how 
a candidate for office had administered sensitive funds in the past. Instead, the focus was  
almost exclusively on the mental anguish that the claimant said to have suffered because of 
the leaflets, which served as the rationale for setting damages at USD 12,000.107 Furthermore, 
during the proceedings the claimant bolstered her argument by explaining that the defendant 
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had only made the defamatory statements when moved by the ‘political euphoria’ of the 
electoral campaign.108 While this would seem to be an invitation to consider how the ‘open, 
intense and dynamic’ nature of electoral processes affects the right of freedom of expression 
(as the IACtHR did in Canese six years earlier), the Court did not comment on it.  
b)  Criminal libel case: Jairala v Monge (2014)109 
This is the only criminal libel case involving two political candidates to reach the appellate 
provincial courts, at least during the last decades. Since 2009 the claimant, Mr Jimmy Jairala, 
has been the Prefect of Guayas, the most populous province in the country. He initiated 
proceedings against Mr Cesar Monge for a series of statements made during the 2014 
sectional elections, when the claimant was standing for re-election and Mr Monge was 
running as a challenger from the opposition. The alleged defamation was a radio interview in 
which Mr Monge revealed the contents of a preliminary report authored by the office of the 
General Comptroller of the State. This document examined severe irregularities in the 
procurement of infrastructure works by the Prefecture allegedly committed during Mr 
Jairala’s term in office. The defendant referred to these facts as ‘the gravest corruption 
scandal in Guayas’s history’.110  
During the first instance proceedings, two main issues were considered by the trial 
judge in order to reach her decision. First, the defendant claimed that the statements were 
substantially true and that they therefore did not constitute false imputations of a crime, 
which meant that the elements of the offence were not met. In response to this, the claimant’s 
counsel argued at the trial hearing that they did not question the veracity of the reports to 
which Mr Monge referred, but rather the fact that he decided to reveal them in the local and 
national press despite their preliminary nature.111 Second, the defendant’s counsel 
emphasised that the recent reforms to the Criminal Code decriminalised a separate offence 
that used to forbid libelling public authorities.112 The claimant argued that this was irrelevant 
because he initiated the proceedings as a private citizen and not in his capacity of public 
official.  
The trial judge found in favour of the defendant. Her judgment considered the 
claimant’s right to have his honour protected under article 11 of the ACHR, but reasoned 
that: 
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[I]n cases in which the sought criminal sanction is directed at matters of public 
interest or political expressions on the backdrop of an electoral campaign, the right 
recognised in Art 13 of the same Convention is harmed, either because there is no 
pressing social need that justifies a criminal sanction or because the restriction is 
disproportionate or constitutes an indirect restriction [to the right to freedom of 
speech].113  
She explained that Mr Jairala had several less restrictive means to protect his 
reputation but opted not to use them. The most relevant among these would have been the 
right of reply that both the ACHR and Ecuadorian law warrant.114 However, the key 
argument for not imposing liability was actually the decriminalisation of the separate criminal 
offence of offending public authorities. The judge ruled that the offence in this case had 
ceased to exist since the defendant would never have proffered the statements if Mr Jairala 
had not been a Prefect standing for re-election. Consequently, she dismissed Mr Jairala’s 
claim and characterised it as an attempt to deceitfully withdraw himself from his status of 
public official in order to ‘mislead the [judicial] authority’ into believing that the defendant 
had referred to him ‘in his role of private citizen’. The judge also considered that in cases 
related to issues of public interest, a criminal conviction is disproportionate under the ACHR. 
Furthermore, she rested on the fact that Mr Jairala was re-elected to disprove that his 
reputation had been harmed.115 
A few months later the appellate Provincial Court reversed this decision, sentenced 
Mr Monge to two years in prison, and ordered him to pay damages of USD 120,000.116 The 
Provincial Court rejected the proposition that there was no longer a criminal offence 
applicable to this case, declaring that the trial judge erred in this regard.117 In other words, the 
Court ruled that Mr Jairala was entitled to pursue a criminal libel action as an ordinary 
citizen. Having established this, the Court then assessed the meaning of Mr Monge’s words to 
be an imputation of a criminal infraction. It then declared that because every citizen has a 
constitutional right to be presumed innocent, the only defence available would be to prove the 
accusations by referring to a sentence that convicted Mr Jairala of the revealed facts.118 In 
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doing this, the Provincial Court did not explain why it had distinguished the precedent set by 
the National Court according to which statements published with the intention of denouncing 
wrongdoing (animi denunciandi) cannot be held liable. It can be speculated that this is 
because those precedents were decided under the previous Criminal Code.119 Finally, the 
Provincial Court refused to rule on whether there was a collision between two constitutional 
rights, pointing out that there are other routes for dealing with that issue.120 Similarly, it did 
not consider the IACtHR’s decision in Canese v Paraguay or any other of its libel cases, 
despite citing the ACHR in order to establish that the presumption of innocence is a human 
right.121 This is baffling, because while first instance and provincial courts cannot apply 
human rights treaties directly, they are compelled to suspend the proceedings and raise the 
matter to the Constitutional Court when they have ‘reasonable and motivated doubts’ over the 
compatibility of a national norm with either the Constitution or the state’s human rights 
obligations.122 The Provincial Court did not do this, but opted to convict Mr Monge instead. 
The matter never reached the National Court. 
This survey of recent cases indicates that Ecuadorian law does not provide many 
defences in cases dealing with electoral speech other than justification. But even then, the 
standard of proof to which defendants are subjected is not clearly defined, which results in 
cases such as Jairala v Monge, where both parties agree that the statements are true in 
substance but the defence of justification still fails. This is a clear contradiction of the 
IACtHR’s decision to not impose excessively stringent standards of proof on public interest 
speech.123 
However, the most interesting aspect of Ecuadorian case law on electoral speech is 
how it has persistently ignored the most salient aspect of these types of cases: the electoral 
process context and the IACtHR’s relevant jurisprudence. There is a clear trend to prioritise 
the protection of honour and reputation to the point where freedom of expression is not 
considered, despite transcendental legal changes. Navas v Villacis was decided before 
Ecuador changed its Constitution in 2008 to one that emphasises human rights obligations, so 
its absolutist approach to reputation may be understandable.124 Velez v Benavides was 
decided in 2009 after this constitutional change, but the National Court still gave undue 
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importance to harm suffered by the claimant, disregarding IACtHR jurisprudence on electoral 
speech. When the first instance decision in Jairala v Monge tried to break away from this 
pattern of ignoring the country’s human rights obligations, the Provincial Court reversed its 
decision.  
The Provincial Court’s judgment seems to deviate significantly from the IACtHR’s 
rulings on freedom of expression in political processes and from Ecuadorian legislation on 
the matter. Thus, the explanation for the Court’s decision could very well be found in how 
judges interpret political climate. On one hand, the lower court probably interpreted the 
complete reform of the Criminal Code as an invitation to liberalise the judicial application of 
criminal defamation. This would explain why the reasoning focused so much on the 
decriminalisation of the separate offence of libel against public authorities: this was taken as 
a cue that the political climate is shifting towards tolerating more electoral speech. On the 
other hand, the Provincial Court’s reversal of the decision took a more conservative 
approach, as if no reforms had taken place. It could be argued that they picked up on a 
different set of signals for assessing the political climate, such as President Correa’s victory 
over a critic in Correa v Palacio in 2011, the passing of a controversial Communications Act 
that imposes a series of obligations on existing media, or Ecuador’s troublesome landscape 
for journalists.125 
 
E.  CONCLUSION 
Defamation laws and the judges who apply them have the difficult task of balancing opposing 
rights. When they have to deal with defamatory political statements this becomes more 
challenging, for they are no longer dealing solely with a claimant’s honour or reputation and 
a defendant’s right to speak freely. In this scenario, considerations about democracy and the 
public’s interest in information come into play. If the statement is not only political but also 
part of an electoral campaign, this tension between the parties’ rights and the public’s interest 
intensifies, as courts must also consider how freedom of speech affects the electoral process 
and how libellous allegations can harm it.126  
The jurisdictions compared in this essay have adopted different approaches to deal 
with these issues. England has largely relied on the common law defence of qualified 
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privilege (and its evolution through Reynolds and section 4 of the Defamation Act 2013) to 
develop the notion that voters have a democratic stake in electoral speech that must be 
considered in addition to the claimant’s reputation. On the contrary, Ecuador has resisted 
assigning legal relevance to the electorate’s interest in these types of cases.127 While this may 
seem natural—after all, countries so different are bound to develop different norms—it sheds 
light on the limitations that human rights treaties suffer in this area of law. Although the 
IACtHR and the ECtHR have established the content of freedom of expression to be almost 
identical when it comes to political and electoral libels, the compared jurisdictions have not 
developed similar mechanisms to ensure similar protection of this right.128 This evidences 
that subscribing to treaties with a liberal outlook on freedom of expression is not enough to 
guarantee liberal defamation laws. It is also not enough to include a commitment to said 
treaties within national law. As the contrast between the Ecuadorian and English evolution of 
defamation law demonstrates, openness to debate does not automatically spill over from 
human rights conventions into national law. On the contrary, it requires adjudicators and 
legislators to be aware of their state’s human rights obligations in relation to freedom of 
expression and libel cases and to be committed to incorporating said standards into the 
national law.  
Thus, it seems clear that the reasons that lead a jurisdiction to broaden or restrict the 
chilling effect of its defamation laws go beyond its human rights obligations and 
constitutional and statutory provisions. At least when they deal with eminently political 
libels, judges appear to be aware of the political context and climate and they try to interpret 
the law accordingly.129 The history of political candidate cases under the common law, its 
reversal in 1952, and its return to a more open application of malice after the HRA suggests 
so. In Ecuador, the same seems to apply: legislatures and judges appear to liberalise how they 
apply criminal defamation laws in response to a perceived shift towards more tolerance, as 
seen in the creation of civil defamation or the first instance in Jairala v Monge; nonetheless, 
they can reverse this if they think the climate does not favour freedom of expression, as in the 
appeal in Jairala v Monge.130 In both countries, the strictly legal norms at the courts’ disposal 
do not always fully account for their decisions in electoral speech cases.131 
																																																						
127 Even when courts ruled that denouncing wrongdoing was not objectionable speech because it lacked animi 
injurandi under the previous Criminal Code, their rationale only addressed a civic duty to stop corruption on the 
part of the defendant. See (n 38).  
128 Canese (n 32); Karakó(n 11). 
129 Loveland (n 78). 
130 Jairala (n 109); Jairala(n 116).  
131 Loveland (n 78).  
DOI: 10.14324/111.2052-1871.081 
 
 141 
The conclusion for those interested in preserving freedom of expression is that the 
finer details of defamation law and its defences require just as much attention, if not more, 
than developments at supranational stages. Fortunately, the recent statutory reforms in both 
jurisdictions as well as some of the analysed cases seem to indicate that the trend is slowly 
moving towards increasing the scope of defensible speech.  
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